This article is published as part of an independent research and analytical initiative.
The views expressed are solely those of the author.
Published: January 2026
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Abstract
International confrontations are often explained as the result of deliberate political choices, aggressive ideologies, or short-term strategic calculations. This article advances a different argument. It contends that many contemporary conflicts are structurally produced by governance systems shaped by historical insecurity. Drawing on three empirical cases—post-Soviet Russia, post-revolutionary Iran, and contemporary China—it demonstrates how deeply embedded threat perceptions transform foreign policy into an extension of regime survival. Under such conditions, confrontation is not an anomaly or miscalculation, but a predictable outcome of historically conditioned institutional logics.
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1. The Limits of Intentionalist Explanations
Prevailing interpretations of international crises tend to privilege intentionalist frameworks. Conflicts are frequently attributed to leadership psychology, ideological ambition, or isolated strategic decisions. Russia’s war in Ukraine, Iran’s regional posture, and China’s behavior in its maritime environment are often analyzed through this lens.
While intuitive, such explanations struggle to account for the long-term consistency of these behaviors. They overlook the extent to which foreign policy is constrained by institutional memory, historical experience, and governance structures. In each of the cases examined here, confrontation cannot be understood independently of trajectories marked by loss, intervention, or persistent vulnerability.
2. Russia after 1991: Territorial Loss and Encirclement Logic
The collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 constituted a profound institutional rupture for Russia. The sudden loss of territory, strategic depth, and regional influence generated a durable sense of geopolitical contraction. This experience has left a lasting imprint on Russian security institutions and strategic thinking.
Since the 1990s, successive Russian security doctrines have emphasized the risk of encirclement, particularly in relation to NATO’s eastward expansion. These developments have not been interpreted as neutral outcomes of neighboring states’ sovereign choices, but as part of a broader pattern of strategic pressure.
Within this framework, Russian foreign policy operates less as an instrument of flexible strategic optimization than as a mechanism of existential prevention. The confrontation with Western actors emerges not solely from discrete decisions, but from an institutionalized perception that state security and regime survival depend on controlling the immediate strategic environment. Escalation becomes structurally plausible even when its material costs are significant.
3. Iran after 1979: Revolution, War, and Regime Securitization
The Islamic Republic of Iran represents a different, yet comparable, configuration. Born from a violent revolution and immediately subjected to a prolonged war with Iraq (1980–1988), the Iranian state was forged under conditions of acute insecurity.
Decades of economic sanctions, diplomatic isolation, and explicit military threats have further reinforced this environment. Over time, these experiences have been institutionalized within Iranian governance structures, producing a worldview in which the international system is perceived as fundamentally hostile.
In this context, Iran’s foreign policy—its regional alliances, asymmetric deterrence strategies, and confrontational rhetoric—cannot be reduced to ideological ambition alone. These policies serve a regime-survival function, reinforcing internal cohesion and legitimizing centralized authority. External confrontation thus becomes a functional component of governance rather than a purely discretionary choice.
4. Contemporary China: Historical Memory and Sovereignty Securitization
China’s trajectory illustrates a distinct but related dynamic. Contemporary Chinese foreign policy is deeply shaped by the historical memory of the so-called “Century of Humiliation,” during which the Chinese state experienced foreign intervention, territorial fragmentation, and erosion of sovereignty.
This memory is not merely rhetorical. It is institutionalized through official discourse, educational narratives, and strategic doctrine. As a result, sovereignty is understood in highly rigid terms, particularly regarding Taiwan, Hong Kong, and the South China Sea.
Within this framework, behaviors often described as assertive or revisionist are better understood as expressions of structural securitization. External challenges to China’s perceived territorial integrity are interpreted through historical patterns of domination. Compromise, under such conditions, carries a high symbolic cost domestically, making confrontation a rational outcome within the institutional logic of governance.
5. A Shared Structural Mechanism across Divergent Regimes
Despite profound differences in ideology, political structure, and economic organization, Russia, Iran, and China exhibit a common mechanism. In all three cases, historical insecurity has been incorporated into the institutions of governance, shaping threat perception and narrowing the range of acceptable foreign policy options.
Foreign policy thus ceases to function as an adaptive strategic domain. It becomes an extension of regime survival, oriented toward preventing perceived existential threats. Under these conditions, confrontation is neither accidental nor exceptional; it is a structurally produced outcome of how political authority is organized.
6. Analytical and Strategic Implications
This perspective challenges approaches that prioritize leadership psychology or moral evaluation. While individual agency matters, it operates within institutional constraints that shape perception and behavior over time.
Strategically, policies based exclusively on coercion or signaling risk reinforcing the dynamics they seek to manage. Where governance systems are structured around permanent threat perception, external pressure without credible mechanisms of security reassurance tends to harden confrontational behavior rather than moderate it.
Conclusion
What is frequently framed as assertiveness or aggression is more accurately understood as the product of governance systems shaped by historical insecurity. When threat perception becomes institutionalized, foreign policy is transformed into an instrument of regime survival. In such contexts, confrontation is not an aberration; it is a predictable structural outcome.
Recognizing this dynamic does not imply justification or endorsement. It provides analytical clarity. Without addressing the historical and institutional foundations of insecurity, international responses risk treating symptoms while leaving underlying drivers intact.
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References
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