How Power Converts Constraint into Obligation
Introduction
Coercion is commonly understood as the overt use of force to compel obedience. It appears as an exceptional act: visible, contestable, and morally charged. Yet in many political systems, coercion does not remain external to the social order. Over time, it is absorbed, stabilized, and rendered legitimate through norms. What begins as constraint is gradually transformed into obligation; what was once imposed becomes expected.
This process — the transformation of coercion into norm — represents one of the most consequential mechanisms of durable domination. Unlike episodic repression, normative coercion does not rely on constant enforcement. It functions through internalization, routinization, and moral reframing. Understanding this transformation is essential for explaining why unjust systems endure even in the absence of continuous violence.
I. Theoretical Foundations: From Force to Normativity
The transformation of coercion into norm has deep roots in political theory and sociology.
Émile Durkheim emphasized that norms acquire force not merely through sanction but through social legitimacy. Once internalized, they operate independently of coercion. What matters is not the presence of punishment, but the shared belief that a rule is natural or necessary.
Max Weber, in his typology of domination, distinguished between domination based on force and domination grounded in legitimacy. For Weber, the most stable forms of power are those perceived as rightful. Coercion becomes durable when it is converted into legal-rational authority, embedded in rules that appear impersonal and objective.
Antonio Gramsci further developed this insight through the concept of hegemony. He argued that domination is most effective when it secures consent rather than relying on repression. Norms play a central role in this process, shaping perceptions of what is reasonable, acceptable, or inevitable.
Michel Foucault later demonstrated how norms function as instruments of power by defining the boundaries of normality itself. In this view, coercion does not disappear; it is redistributed across institutions, practices, and forms of knowledge, becoming less visible but more pervasive.
II. Conceptual Clarification: What Does It Mean to Transform Coercion into Norm?
The transformation of coercion into norm involves several interrelated steps:
- an initially coercive measure is introduced under exceptional justification (security, morality, necessity),
- the measure is stabilized through repetition and regulation,
- its enforcement becomes routinized and predictable,
- compliance is reframed as obligation rather than submission.
At this stage, individuals no longer experience obedience as externally imposed. Deviance, rather than coercion, becomes the problem. The norm no longer needs to justify itself; it demands conformity by virtue of its existence.
III. Three Empirical Illustrations
1. Emergency Powers and the Normalization of Exceptional Rule
States of emergency provide a classical illustration of coercion transformed into norm.
Historically, emergency measures have been justified as temporary responses to existential threats. However, as Giorgio Agamben has shown, prolonged emergencies tend to normalize exceptional powers. Restrictions on movement, assembly, or expression initially presented as extraordinary gradually become embedded in ordinary legal frameworks.
Over time, citizens adapt their behavior. What once provoked resistance becomes routine. The coercive suspension of rights is no longer perceived as repression, but as responsible governance. The exception ceases to appear exceptional.
2. Gender Regulation and Normative Constraint
Gender norms offer a powerful example of coercion operating without visible force.
In many societies, restrictions imposed on women’s mobility, appearance, education, or participation in public life originate in coercive enforcement. Yet once codified into social expectations and moral narratives, these constraints are internalized and reproduced by society itself.
Pierre Bourdieu’s concept of symbolic violence is particularly relevant here. He shows how domination persists not through constant force, but through norms that appear legitimate and natural, even to those they disadvantage. Coercion survives precisely because it is no longer experienced as coercion.
3. Colonial Rule and the Institutionalization of Obedience
Colonial administrations frequently relied on transforming coercive domination into normative order.
Direct violence was often replaced by legal codes, administrative hierarchies, and customary regulations that framed domination as order and civilization. Colonial subjects were governed through norms defining proper conduct, labor obligations, and legal status.
As Frantz Fanon observed, the most enduring damage of colonialism lay not only in physical repression, but in the internalization of inferiority and obedience. Coercion succeeded when it no longer required constant enforcement.
IV. Effects on Agency and Resistance
The transformation of coercion into norm produces profound political consequences:
- resistance becomes morally stigmatized rather than politically contested,
- compliance is interpreted as virtue rather than survival,
- dissent is reframed as deviance or irresponsibility,
- domination becomes self-reproducing.
In such contexts, power does not need to act aggressively. It governs through expectation, habit, and moral framing. Individuals discipline themselves and others in the name of the norm.
Conclusion
The transformation of coercion into norm represents one of the most subtle and enduring forms of domination. It marks the passage from imposed obedience to internalized obligation. Power no longer appears as force, but as order; no longer as constraint, but as responsibility.
Recognizing this process is essential for any serious analysis of political domination. It reveals that the disappearance of visible repression does not necessarily signal freedom. Often, it signals that coercion has succeeded.
References
- Weber, Max. Economy and Society.
- Durkheim, Émile. The Division of Labor in Society.
- Gramsci, Antonio. Prison Notebooks.
- Foucault, Michel. Discipline and Punish; Society Must Be Defended.
- Bourdieu, Pierre. Masculine Domination.
- Agamben, Giorgio. State of Exception.
- Fanon, Frantz. The Wretched of the Earth.