Beijing 2025: Strategic Rituals, Emerging Multipolarity, and the Erosion of Western Hegemony

Abstract

On 3 September 2025, Beijing staged an unprecedented military parade commemorating the eightieth anniversary of Japan’s defeat in World War II. More than symbolic remembrance, the event functioned as a strategic ritual combining military spectacle, institutional diplomacy, and ideological narratives to challenge U.S. primacy. This article argues that the parade illustrates the erosion of unipolarity and the emergence of contested multipolarity. Drawing on theories of polarity, deterrence, and spectacle, it demonstrates how China uses ritualized visibility to consolidate alliances, dramatize Western fragmentation, and claim legitimacy in the Global South. By combining documentary analysis with secondary literature and strategic assessments, the article advances an interpretive framework of “strategic ritualism,” showing how rituals accelerate perceptions of systemic transition.

Keywords: China, Multipolarity, Strategic Ritual, Eurasian Alignments, Western Hegemony

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Introduction

On 3 September 2025, China commemorated the eightieth anniversary of Japan’s surrender with an unprecedented parade in Tiananmen Square. Taking place immediately after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, the event intentionally coupled institutional diplomacy with hard military display. In so doing, Beijing underscored both its claim to great power status and its determination to shape the reconfiguration of world order.

This article advances the argument that the parade should not be read as a mere display of force, but as a strategic ritual—a performative act designed to reconfigure perceptions of legitimacy and hierarchy in international politics. The analysis is guided by three research questions:

            1. How does China employ military spectacle as a form of strategic communication?

            2. To what extent does the emerging Sino-Russian-North Korean axis represent a structural bloc rather than a tactical alignment?

            3. What does the fragmented Western response reveal about the erosion of hegemony in the post-unipolar era?

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Concepts and Definitions

            •  Multipolarity. Following Kenneth Waltz, multipolarity denotes a distribution of power in which several states possess comparable military and economic capacities, enabling both self-defense and global projection.¹ More recent approaches include technological, financial, and institutional dimensions, recognizing that contemporary power cannot be reduced to armed strength alone.²

            • Hegemonic Erosion. Paul Kennedy warned of “imperial overstretch,” when global commitments exceed domestic resources.³ More recently, G. John Ikenberry has argued that U.S. primacy erodes through fiscal strain, declining economic share, and the inability to sustain the liberal order against rising challengers.⁴

            •  Strategic Ritual. Building on Murray Edelman’s concept of political spectacle,⁵ this article defines a strategic ritual as a synchronized performance of military and diplomatic choreography aimed at communicating deterrence, consolidating alliances, and legitimizing leadership. Unlike ordinary parades, strategic rituals are deliberately staged to align visibility with institutional diplomacy, maximizing symbolic impact.

By clarifying these concepts, the article situates the Beijing 2025 parade within ongoing theoretical debates and highlights its broader significance for understanding systemic transition.

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Notes 

            1. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

            2. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

            3. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).

            4. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

            5. Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

Literature Review — Multipolarity, Hegemonic Erosion, and Strategic Rituals

Multipolarity and Systemic Transformation

Theories of polarity remain foundational to international relations. Kenneth Waltz argued that multipolar systems tend to be unstable because of the complexity of balancing among multiple actors.⁶ John Mearsheimer’s offensive realism went further, claiming that great powers in multipolar settings are compelled to maximize relative power, thus increasing rivalry.⁷

By contrast, Graham Allison’s “Thucydides Trap” thesis suggests that systemic stress arises when a rising power threatens to displace an established hegemon, with war becoming “likely if not inevitable.”⁸ While widely debated, it captures the structural pressures framing U.S.–China relations. Amitav Acharya, however, challenges both binary and deterministic views by advancing the concept of a “multiplex world,” where overlapping institutions and regional powers dilute singular hegemonies.⁹

More recent scholarship nuances these debates. Alastair Iain Johnston emphasizes China’s gradualist integration into global institutions, which complicates notions of outright systemic rupture.¹⁰ Evelyn Goh has stressed hedging strategies by middle powers in Asia, reflecting that multipolarity is less about neat blocs than about adaptive alignments.¹¹

This article aligns with Acharya and Goh in recognizing plural and layered forms of order, but adds a performative dimension: Beijing 2025 illustrates how rituals themselves can accelerate perceptions of multipolarity, dramatizing systemic transition before material balances fully shift.

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Hegemonic Erosion and U.S. Decline

The literature on hegemonic decline remains polarized. Paul Kennedy identified “imperial overstretch” as a recurring cause of great power decline, linking economic strain to unsustainable external commitments.¹² Joseph Nye countered by arguing that the United States retains unmatched reservoirs of soft power—the ability to attract through culture, values, and institutions.¹³

More recently, Michael Beckley contends that U.S. decline is overstated, emphasizing relative wealth, innovation, and demographic resilience.¹⁴ Yet scholars such as Barry Posen highlight overextension, fiscal constraints, and domestic polarization as real structural weaknesses.¹⁵ G. John Ikenberry insists that U.S. influence persists less through dominance than through institutional stickiness, even as challengers build alternative frameworks such as BRICS and the SCO.¹⁶

This debate frames Beijing 2025 as more than a Chinese assertion: it dramatized Western fragility, contrasting U.S. fiscal strain and European ambivalence with China’s choreography of order and discipline.

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Strategic Communication, Ritual, and Spectacle

Theorists of political symbolism provide useful tools for interpreting Beijing’s parade. Murray Edelman argued that rituals function as “technologies of rule,” producing legitimacy by staging unity and power.¹⁷ Guy Debord’s concept of the “society of the spectacle” stressed that modern politics is enacted through performance, where visibility becomes a form of domination.¹⁸

Applied internationally, parades, summits, and mega-events can be understood as spectacles of sovereignty. Scholars of authoritarian politics, such as Lisa Wedeen, have shown how staged performances consolidate both domestic compliance and external impressions.¹⁹ However, few works systematically connect ritualized visibility to deterrence and systemic multipolarity.

Military studies on China’s rise—such as Caitlin Talmadge on nuclear strategy²⁰ and Taylor Fravel on Chinese doctrine²¹—have examined capabilities, but rarely the performative unveiling of those capabilities as an independent strategy. This article contributes by identifying Beijing 2025 as a paradigmatic case of strategic ritualism: the synchronization of military spectacle and institutional diplomacy to project credibility, enforce bloc cohesion, and claim symbolic leadership.

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Notes 

            6. Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics (Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley, 1979).

            7. John J. Mearsheimer, The Tragedy of Great Power Politics (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001; updated ed. 2014).

            8. Graham Allison, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? (Boston: Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2017).

            9. Amitav Acharya, The End of American World Order (Cambridge: Polity, 2018).

            10. Alastair Iain Johnston, “Is China a Status Quo Power?” International Security 27, no. 4 (2003): 5–56.

            11. Evelyn Goh, “Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia,” International Security 32, no. 3 (2008): 113–57.

            12. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).

            13. Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics (New York: PublicAffairs, 2004).

            14.  Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

            15. Barry R. Posen, Restraint: A New Foundation for U.S. Grand Strategy (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014).

            16. G. John Ikenberry, Liberal Leviathan: The Origins, Crisis, and Transformation of the American World Order (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2011).

            17.  Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

            18. Guy Debord, La société du spectacle (Paris: Buchet-Chastel, 1967).

            19. Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

            20. Caitlin Talmadge, “The U.S.-China Nuclear Relationship: Why Competition Is Likely and Dangerous,” Annual Review of Political Science 20 (2017): 105–25.

            21. M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

Methodology

Case Selection

This article adopts a critical case study approach, focusing on the Beijing military parade of 3 September 2025. The case is selected because it simultaneously (a) commemorated a historic defeat of Japanese militarism, (b) followed immediately after the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) summit, and (c) showcased unprecedented military capabilities. These three dimensions—historical, institutional, and technological—make Beijing 2025 an ideal case to study how rituals operate as both symbolic and strategic instruments of power.²²

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Operationalization of Key Concepts

To move beyond descriptive usage, the article defines observable indicators for each concept:

            •   Multipolarity → measured through the relative distribution of material capabilities (GDP share, defense spending), institutional participation (e.g., SCO, BRICS+), and recognition of status (formal invitations, summit participation).²³

            •  Hegemonic erosion → traced through U.S. fiscal indicators (debt/GDP ratios), political polarization (Congressional voting data, Pew surveys), and alliance cohesion (NATO and EU positions on China).²⁴

            •  Strategic ritual → operationalized as the synchronization of (1) military spectacle (weapons unveiled, troop formations), (2) institutional diplomacy (timing alongside SCO), and (3) ideological narrative (Xi Jinping’s speech invoking sovereignty and rejuvenation).²⁵

These criteria allow the analysis to evaluate the parade as more than symbolic display: it becomes a structured act of statecraft.

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Data Sources

The analysis draws on three categories of evidence:

            1. Primary discourses → official speeches (Xi Jinping, Ministry of Defense), government communiqués, and media coverage in Xinhua, People’s Daily, South China Morning Post, Washington Post, and Le Monde.²⁶

            2. Secondary academic literature → theories of polarity, decline, and political spectacle (Waltz, Mearsheimer, Acharya, Debord, Edelman, Wedeen).²⁷

            3. Strategic assessments → reports and databases from recognized institutions such as the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), RAND Corporation, U.S. Department of Defense, European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), and the Congressional Budget Office (CBO).²⁸

The sources were selected through triangulation: claims were cross-checked across at least two independent categories to minimize bias.

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Analytic Strategy

The research followed a three-step analytic process:

            1. Visibility and deterrence → coding military capabilities unveiled (DF-41, J-20, drones, JL-3) and assessing their signaling function through Schelling’s framework of credible communication.

            2. Bloc consolidation → analyzing the symbolic meaning of allied attendance (Russia, North Korea, Global South leaders) and their functional roles in a possible Eurasian alignment.

            3. Narrative framing → identifying themes in Xi Jinping’s speech and Chinese media linking anti-colonial memory to contemporary sovereignty.

Coding was thematic: references to deterrence, legitimacy, sovereignty, and multipolarity were categorized and compared across sources.

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Scope and Limitations

This is an interpretive study, privileging discourse and symbolism over quantitative force ratios. Its contribution lies not in measuring balance-of-power numerically but in interpreting how ritualized visibility shapes perceptions of order.

Limitations include:

            •   Source bias → Chinese outlets emphasize rejuvenation, Western reports stress threat inflation. Mitigated by triangulation.

            •  Case specificity → the Beijing 2025 parade is unique and may not generalize to other contexts (e.g., Moscow or Pyongyang parades).

            •  Temporal limitation → the article focuses on short-term perception shifts; long-term effects remain uncertain.

By acknowledging these limits, the article strengthens its credibility while clarifying the boundaries of its argument.

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Notes

            22. John Gerring, Case Study Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

            23. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), Yearbook: Armaments, Disarmament and International Security 2024 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2024).

            24. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The 2025 U.S. Budget Outlook (Washington: CBO, 2025); Pew Research Center, Polarization and Trust in Government (Washington, 2024).

            25. Xi Jinping, “Speech at the 80th Anniversary of Victory over Japanese Aggression,” Xinhua, September 3, 2025.

            26. South China Morning Post, “China Tests Intercontinental Supersonic Drone in Xinjiang,” July 18, 2025; Washington Post, “China’s New Military Parade Signals Global Ambition,” September 4, 2025.

            27. Lisa Wedeen, Ambiguities of Domination: Politics, Rhetoric, and Symbols in Contemporary Syria(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999).

            28. International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025 (London: Routledge/IISS, 2025); RAND Corporation, China’s J-20 and the Future of Air Dominance (Santa Monica: RAND, 2024); European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Europe Between Washington and Beijing (Brussels: ECFR, 2024).

Strategic Weapons and the Politics of Visibility

Hypersonic Missiles and the Inversion of Secrecy

The centerpiece of the Beijing 2025 parade was the unveiling of the DF-27 and DF-41 hypersonic missiles. According to the International Institute for Strategic Studies, these systems can reach speeds above Mach 10 and deliver conventional or nuclear payloads across intercontinental ranges while evading U.S. missile defense systems.²⁹ In contrast to Cold War traditions of concealment, Beijing reversed the logic of secrecy: by displaying its most advanced systems, it imposed psychological pressure on adversaries, forcing them to plan against demonstrated rather than hypothetical capabilities.

This logic resonates with Thomas Schelling’s classic insight: deterrence depends not only on capabilities but on what one can credibly convey.³⁰ Yet, critics note that parading hypersonic systems may also invite countermeasures, such as U.S. investment in directed-energy weapons and missile-tracking satellites.³¹ Thus, visibility enhances deterrence but also accelerates arms racing.

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Stealth Fighters and Industrial Scale

The flyover of dozens of Chengdu J-20 stealth fighters emphasized not only technological sophistication but also industrial scalability. RAND analysts argue that mass production marks the decisive threshold between symbolic prototypes and credible force projection.³² By displaying entire squadrons, Beijing signaled attritional resilience in the event of prolonged conflict.

However, Western military experts caution that quantitative display does not guarantee qualitative parity.³³ Training, logistics, and combat integration remain uncertain. Here again, ritual visibility dramatizes intent but does not resolve the gap between potential and actual combat effectiveness.

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Supersonic Drones and the Electromagnetic Spectrum

The introduction of intercontinental supersonic drones, first reported in South China Morning Post, showcased China’s ambition to dominate both the physical and electromagnetic spectrum.³⁴ These drones combine long-range strike potential with electronic warfare capabilities, threatening the communications infrastructure that underpins U.S. military superiority.

Elsa Kania has argued that the People’s Liberation Army increasingly treats cyberspace and electromagnetic warfare as co-equal domains, rather than auxiliary tools.³⁵ Yet, skeptics contend that operational reliability of these drones remains untested; prototypes may exaggerate effectiveness when presented in ritualized displays.³⁶

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Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrence

Although absent from the parade, official commentary emphasized the ongoing development of Type-096 submarines armed with JL-3 missiles. Research from the U.S. Naval War College underscores that the JL-3’s range exceeds 10,000 km, enabling second-strike capability against the U.S. homeland from secure bastions.³⁷

This development represents a crucial step toward nuclear parity, challenging confidence in U.S. extended deterrence. As M. Taylor Fravel observes, survivable sea-based deterrence stabilizes retaliation potential but simultaneously raises escalation risks by reducing incentives for restraint.³⁸

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Outer Space as the Next Frontier

President Xi Jinping’s reference to safeguarding security “across all domains, including outer space” echoed Pentagon assessments of China’s anti-satellite weapons and co-orbital platforms.³⁹ Symbolically, invoking outer space extended the imagined battlefield into the celestial domain, dramatizing China’s determination to contest U.S. dominance beyond terrestrial theaters.

Yet, space militarization also underscores the paradox of visibility: demonstrating counter-space weapons may signal capability, but excessive disclosure risks undermining the very secrecy that enhances deterrent ambiguity.⁴⁰

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Notes 

            29.  International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS), The Military Balance 2025 (London: Routledge/IISS, 2025).

            30. Thomas C. Schelling, Arms and Influence (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1966), 35.

            31. Congressional Research Service (CRS), Hypersonic Weapons and U.S. Strategy (Washington: CRS, 2024).

            32. RAND Corporation, China’s J-20 and the Future of Air Dominance (Santa Monica: RAND, 2024).

            33. Richard A. Bitzinger, “Assessing the J-20: Capabilities and Limitations,” Asian Security 18, no. 1 (2022): 34–52.

            34. South China Morning Post, “China Tests Intercontinental Supersonic Drone in Xinjiang,” July 18, 2025.

            35. Elsa B. Kania, “The PLA’s Strategic Thinking on the Electromagnetic Spectrum,” Journal of Strategic Studies 47, no. 2 (2024): 215–32.

            36. Michael S. Chase, “China’s Military Unmanned Systems: Emerging Capabilities,” Survival 64, no. 3 (2022): 117–38.

            37. China Maritime Studies Institute, The Type-096 SSBN and China’s Sea-Based Nuclear Deterrent(Newport: U.S. Naval War College, 2025).

            38. M. Taylor Fravel, Active Defense: China’s Military Strategy Since 1949 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2019).

            39.  U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report on Military and Security Developments Involving the PRC(Washington: DoD, 2024).

            40. Bleddyn E. Bowen, War in Space: Strategy, Spacepower, and Geopolitics (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2020).

The Sino-Russian-North Korean Axis — Structural or Tactical?

Russia’s Strategic Reorientation

The presence of Russian President Vladimir Putin in Beijing symbolized more than ceremonial solidarity. Since the war in Ukraine and the imposition of Western sanctions, Moscow has intensified its “pivot to Asia.” Joint bomber patrols in the Sea of Japan, technology transfers in missile defense, and energy deals denominated in yuan illustrate a pattern of structural convergence rather than ad hoc tactical cooperation.⁴¹

Alexander Korolev argues that these shifts reflect systemic incentives binding Moscow and Beijing into complementary trajectories: Russia supplies energy and military know-how, while China provides markets and technology.⁴² Yet Bobo Lo cautions that this partnership remains a wary embrace: China dominates economically and technologically, while Russia, though retaining nuclear parity, faces severe demographic decline and fiscal vulnerabilities.⁴³

This asymmetry underpins the symbolism of Beijing 2025: for Russia, participation validated its indispensability; for China, showcasing Putin reinforced the image of a consolidated Eurasian bloc.

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North Korea as Tactical Spoiler

The attendance of North Korean leader Kim Jong-un reinforced the impression of a trilateral axis. Pyongyang benefits from associating with China’s civilizational narrative, while Moscow gains material support through clandestine arms transfers in exchange for food and energy.⁴⁴

However, analysts stress that North Korea’s role is instrumental rather than structural.⁴⁵ Its value lies in creating disruption at low cost—testing missiles, pressuring South Korea, or straining U.S. alliance commitments. Yet its economic weakness and dependence on external patrons prevent Pyongyang from shaping the bloc’s long-term trajectory.

Thus, the triangular arrangement mirrors Cold War blocs but with asymmetries updated:

            •   China as senior partner (economic-technological dominance),

            •  Russia as nuclear equal but economic junior,

            •  North Korea as tactical spoiler with disruptive potential disproportionate to its size.

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Authoritarian Spectacle as Political Technology

The parade’s choreography—synchronized formations, slogans of rejuvenation, precision drills—echoed North Korean political theater. Murray Edelman’s notion of spectacle as a “technology of rule” is evident: ritualized performance reinforced domestic cohesion while projecting external legitimacy.⁴⁶

By placing Putin and Kim alongside Xi, Beijing transformed a national commemoration into an international performance of authoritarian solidarity. Symbolically, the arrangement conveyed hierarchy within unity: China at the helm, Russia as indispensable partner, North Korea as disruptive junior.

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Counter-Arguments and Fragility

Despite appearances, several scholars question whether this axis constitutes a durable bloc:

            1. Asymmetrical dependency. Russia’s overreliance on China risks turning the relationship into dependency rather than partnership.⁴⁷

            2. Divergent interests. China seeks global legitimacy, while North Korea thrives on isolation and brinkmanship; Moscow oscillates between revisionism and survival.

            3. Historical mistrust. Sino-Soviet rivalry in the 1960s and Sino-North Korean frictions highlight the fragility of Eurasian alignments.⁴⁸

In this sense, Beijing 2025 may have dramatized unity, but the performance risks concealing fissures that could resurface under stress.

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Notes 

            41. Alexander Lukin, China and Russia: The New Rapprochement (Cambridge: Polity, 2018), ch. 7.

            42. Alexander Korolev, “Russia’s Strategic Reorientation Toward China: Drivers and Implications,” International Security 49, no. 1 (2025).

            43. Bobo Lo, A Wary Embrace: What the China-Russia Relationship Means for the World (London: Penguin, 2023).

            44. Institute for Strategic Studies Seoul (ISSS), North Korea-Russia Military Exchanges 2024–25 (Seoul: ISSS, 2025).

            45. Andrei Lankov, The Real North Korea: Life and Politics in the Failed Stalinist Utopia (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2013).

            46. Murray Edelman, Constructing the Political Spectacle (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1988).

            47. Maria Shagina, “Russia’s Sanctions Evasion and China’s Leverage,” Survival 65, no. 4 (2023): 77–98.

            48. Sergey Radchenko, Unwanted Visionaries: The Soviet Failure in Asia at the End of the Cold War(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

Western Cohesion Under Strain

The United States: Fiscal Strain and Strategic Overstretch

The Beijing parade occurred at a moment of growing U.S. fiscal fragility. In 2025, the Congressional Budget Office projected federal debt to surpass 120 percent of GDP within a decade if current trajectories persist.⁴⁹ This recalls Paul Kennedy’s thesis of “imperial overstretch,” whereby external commitments exceed internal resources, eroding the foundations of hegemony.⁵⁰

Domestic polarization compounds these vulnerabilities. As Joseph Nye reminds us, “the credibility of American leadership abroad is inseparable from its ability to govern effectively at home.”⁵¹ Increasing partisanship and legislative gridlock reduce Washington’s ability to project consistent foreign policy, undermining deterrence credibility.

Yet, counter-arguments stress U.S. resilience. Michael Beckley highlights enduring U.S. advantages in innovation, demographics, and alliances.⁵² Moreover, NATO’s post-Ukraine expansion (Finland and Sweden’s accession) illustrates continued Western cohesion under pressure. Thus, while overstretch is real, it is not necessarily terminal.

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Europe’s Strategic Dilemma

Europe’s response to the parade revealed ambivalence. Washington condemned the display as destabilizing, but Berlin and Paris refrained from escalation, reflecting economic interdependence with China. The European Council on Foreign Relations has described Europe’s predicament as a choice between alignment with Washington or pragmatic hedging to safeguard trade.⁵³

This paradox undermines the rhetoric of European “strategic autonomy.” François Heisbourg observes that the EU has not resolved its dependence on U.S. security guarantees while simultaneously deepening economic reliance on China.⁵⁴

Nevertheless, counter-arguments emphasize Europe’s emerging assertiveness: the European Commission’s adoption of a “de-risking” strategy in 2023 and closer cooperation with NATO signal a growing recognition of geopolitical stakes. The muted response to Beijing 2025 thus reflects hesitation rather than outright acquiescence.

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The Global South: Attraction and Ambiguity

The attendance of leaders from Africa, Latin America, and Central Asia underscored Beijing’s appeal in the Global South. Deborah Brautigam shows that many African governments view Chinese financing as predictable and less conditional than Western aid.⁵⁵ Kishore Mahbubani adds that China’s model of infrastructure-driven growth resonates in postcolonial societies weary of liberal prescriptions.⁵⁶

Yet, attraction is not synonymous with alignment. Oliver Stuenkel notes that many Global South states pursue strategic hedging, accepting Chinese infrastructure while maintaining ties with the United States.⁵⁷ Participation in Beijing’s rituals therefore reflects opportunism rather than ideological commitment.

Moreover, skepticism exists within the South itself: accusations of “debt-trap diplomacy,” environmental concerns, and domestic backlash against Chinese labor practices highlight the fragility of Beijing’s legitimacy.⁵⁸ Thus, the Global South provides symbolic legitimacy but not guaranteed allegiance.

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Notes 

            49. Congressional Budget Office (CBO), The 2025 U.S. Budget Outlook (Washington: CBO, 2025).

            50. Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers (New York: Random House, 1987).

            51. Joseph S. Nye, Is the American Century Over? (Cambridge: Polity, 2015), 44.

            52. Michael Beckley, Unrivaled: Why America Will Remain the World’s Sole Superpower (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2018).

            53. European Council on Foreign Relations (ECFR), Europe Between Washington and Beijing (Brussels: ECFR, 2024).

            54. François Heisbourg, Strategic Europe: Power and Fragility in the 21st Century (London: Routledge, 2022).

            55. Deborah Brautigam, Will Africa Feed China? (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015).

            56. Kishore Mahbubani, Has the West Lost It? (London: Penguin, 2019).

            57. Oliver Stuenkel, The BRICS and the Future of Global Order (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2015).

            58. Carmen Reinhart, “The New Debt Trap? Chinese Lending in Africa,” Foreign Affairs 100, no. 3 (2021): 84–97.

Prospective Outlook and Conclusion

Scenarios for the 2030s

Scenario One: Consolidated Multipolarity

If current trajectories persist, the 2030s may witness the consolidation of a multipolar order:

            •     a Sino-Russian-North Korean axis anchoring Eurasian security,

            •    BRICS+ functioning as a counterweight to G7 economic governance,

            •    and the Global South symbolically aligning with Beijing as guarantor of postcolonial sovereignty.

This would dilute but not abolish Western primacy, resembling nineteenth-century multipolarity where shifting coalitions structured global order.

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Scenario Two: Fragile Multipolarity

Alternatively, contradictions within the Eurasian bloc—Russia’s suspicion of Chinese dominance, North Korea’s unpredictability, and China’s domestic vulnerabilities—could undermine cohesion. Such fragility would echo the interwar period, when alliances lacked institutional depth and collapsed under stress. In this scenario, Western hegemony continues to erode, but no coherent alternative order emerges.

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Scenario Three: Dual Hegemony

A third outcome is the crystallization of dual hegemony: Washington and Beijing as co-dominant poles, with Europe and Russia relegated to secondary roles. This would require mechanisms of crisis management and mutual restraint currently absent, making it less probable but not impossible.

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The Role of Technology and New Domains

Across all scenarios, technology will be decisive. Advances in artificial intelligence, quantum communication, hypersonics, and outer-space militarization are likely to redefine deterrence. Elsa Kania notes that China increasingly treats cyberspace and outer space as co-equal domains of warfare, indicating that future contests will transcend terrestrial battlefields.⁵⁹

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Scope and Limitations

This analysis interprets Beijing 2025 as a ritualized condensation of systemic shifts. However, three limits must be recognized:

            1. Temporal scope → short-term perceptions may not translate into durable alignments.

            2. Case specificity → Chinese rituals differ from Russian or Western performances, limiting generalizability.

            3. Empirical gaps → reliance on official discourses risks overstating capabilities; combat effectiveness remains untested.

Acknowledging these limits clarifies that Beijing 2025 dramatized, but did not determine, the erosion of U.S. hegemony.

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Theoretical Contribution

This article makes three contributions to international relations:

            1. Multipolarity as performative. Beyond material measures, perceptions of parity are accelerated through ritualized visibility.

            2. Deterrence through spectacle. Strategic rituals invert secrecy by transforming weapons into public symbols of credibility.

            3. Legitimacy through synchronization. By aligning military display with institutional diplomacy and anti-colonial narratives, China has pioneered what may be termed strategic ritualism—a fusion of coercive credibility and symbolic legitimacy.

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Conclusion

The Beijing parade of 3 September 2025 dramatized more than the commemoration of victory over Japan; it condensed into a single spectacle the broader dynamics of systemic transition in world politics. By unveiling advanced weaponry, synchronizing with the SCO summit, and invoking narratives of sovereignty and rejuvenation, Beijing crafted a strategic ritual that communicated deterrence, enforced bloc cohesion, and sought legitimacy in the Global South.

This study has argued that such rituals do not merely reflect power but actively accelerate perceptions of multipolarity. Building on but moving beyond Waltz’s polarity theory and Mearsheimer’s offensive realism, the article has drawn on Acharya’s conception of a multiplex world to highlight the performative dimension of systemic change. In this sense, strategic ritualism constitutes both an empirical practice of authoritarian states and a theoretical lens for understanding how order is dramatized and contested.

The case also illuminates the erosion of U.S. primacy not simply as material decline but as a crisis of legitimacy and cohesion. Western overstretch, European ambivalence, and the opportunistic engagement of the Global South reveal how rituals of rising powers exploit fissures in the hegemon’s order. Yet, counter-arguments caution against overstating bloc cohesion: the Sino-Russian-North Korean axis remains asymmetric and fragile, while Global South participation is often pragmatic rather than ideological.

The contribution of this article is threefold:

            1. It conceptualizes multipolarity as performative, demonstrating that rituals of visibility can reconfigure systemic perceptions even before balances fully shift.

            2.  It reframes deterrence theory by showing how credibility is dramatized through spectacle, not only secrecy.

            3. It advances the study of legitimacy in global order, linking military parades and institutional diplomacy to broader struggles over symbolic authority.

Future research should test the concept of strategic ritualism across cases—Moscow’s Victory Day parades, Pyongyang’s mass spectacles, and even Western mega-events—to examine whether ritualized performances systematically shape perceptions of polarity and legitimacy. Only through such comparative analysis can we assess whether Beijing 2025 marks a turning point in international order or merely another episode in the longue durée of hegemonic contestation.