Institutional Continuity and the Survival of Political Order
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Introduction générale
Alternation, rupture, and the architecture of political survival
Political change is a universal feature of organized societies. Governments rise and fall, leaders succeed one another, and regimes evolve through elections, coups, reforms, or negotiated transitions. Yet history demonstrates a striking asymmetry: while some political systems absorb change and preserve order, others disintegrate under the weight of transition. In the former, alternation of power is a routine political event; in the latter, it becomes an existential rupture capable of erasing the state itself.
This divergence cannot be adequately explained by reference to leadership quality, political culture, or ideological alignment alone. Numerous cases show capable leaders presiding over collapsing systems, while mediocre leaders govern stable states. Nor can political will suffice as an explanation: will is episodic, whereas political order is cumulative. The decisive variable lies elsewhere — in the degree of institutional continuity embedded within the political system.
Institutional continuity refers to the capacity of rules, administrative structures, coercive authority, and decision-making procedures to endure beyond the tenure of individual officeholders. It is the property that allows political authority to remain functional even as power circulates. Where such continuity exists, political transitions reorganize governance. Where it is absent, transitions interrupt it.
This article advances a central thesis: the survival of political order across transitions depends not on leadership, ideology, or reformist intent, but on the density and autonomy of institutions capable of outliving political rupture. In systems where authority is personalized and administration subordinated to loyalty, political change does not recalibrate power; it resets the system. Norms cease to guide behavior, administrative memory erodes, and informal power supplants rule-based governance.
The consequences are profound. In such contexts, reforms can accumulate without producing stability, electoral cycles intensify fragility rather than legitimacy, and each leadership change becomes a moment of systemic vulnerability. Stability, under these conditions, is not lost — it was never structurally produced.
The sections that follow examine this phenomenon through comparative institutional analysis, drawing on historical and contemporary cases across different regions. The focus is not on failure as spectacle, but on failure as structure: how political systems lose the capacity to carry rules across time.
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I. Alternation versus dissolution: A comparative institutional lens
Political alternation and state dissolution are often conflated in transitional contexts, yet they represent fundamentally different institutional processes. Alternation implies that authority changes hands while the system remains intact. Dissolution implies that the system itself disintegrates, leaving behind fragmented authority and competing sources of order.
1. Alternation as an Institutional Achievement
In consolidated political systems, alternation is not merely tolerated; it is routinized. The defining feature of such systems is not consensus, but procedural resilience. Elections may be contentious, leadership transitions tense, yet administrative routines persist, legal frameworks remain operative, and coercive authority stays centralized.
Post-war Germany provides a paradigmatic example. Despite deep ideological cleavages during the Cold War, alternation between Christian Democratic and Social Democratic governments did not disrupt the continuity of public administration or legal authority. The Grundgesetz (Basic Law) constrained executive action, while a professional civil service ensured policy execution independent of partisan turnover (Dyson, The State Tradition in Western Europe).
Similarly, in Japan, political dominance by the Liberal Democratic Party for decades did not weaken institutional continuity. When alternation finally occurred in the 1990s and again in 2009, the bureaucracy retained operational autonomy, preventing administrative collapse (Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle).
In these cases, alternation functioned as a political variable layered upon a stable institutional substrate.
2. Dissolution as Institutional Interruption
By contrast, in systems with low institutional density, political change frequently results in the interruption of governance itself. Ministries cease to function coherently, security forces fragment, and legal authority becomes contingent on personal allegiance.
The collapse of the Somali state in the early 1990s illustrates this dynamic. The fall of Siad Barre did not produce a reorganization of power, but the disappearance of centralized authority altogether. Administrative institutions had long been subordinated to clan loyalty and personal networks; once the regime fell, nothing institutional remained to absorb the transition (Menkhaus, State Collapse in Somalia).
A similar pattern emerged in Libya after 2011. The removal of Muammar Gaddafi eliminated not only the regime, but the thin institutional structures that had been deliberately hollowed out to prevent bureaucratic autonomy. Political transition thus produced not alternation, but fragmentation (Vandewalle, Libya Since Independence).
In such systems, political authority is not transferred — it evaporates.
3. The False Promise of Reform without Continuity
A recurrent illusion in fragile systems is the belief that reform accumulation can substitute for institutional continuity. Constitutions are rewritten, ministries renamed, electoral laws amended — yet the underlying logic of personalization remains intact.
Afghanistan between 2001 and 2021 exemplifies this paradox. Despite repeated reforms, elections, and international support, political authority remained deeply personalized, administrative turnover constant, and coercive capacity fragmented. Each electoral cycle intensified uncertainty rather than consolidating order, culminating in systemic collapse once political support was withdrawn (Rubin, Fragmentation of Afghanistan).
The lesson is structural: reform without continuity reorganizes form, not function.
Personalized Authority and the Erosion of Administrative Memory
Institutional continuity is not an abstract property; it is produced and sustained through concrete organizational mechanisms. Among these, administrative memory occupies a central place. It is through the accumulation, transmission, and routinization of administrative knowledge that political systems maintain coherence across time. Where administrative memory is preserved, political change can be absorbed. Where it erodes, governance becomes episodic and fragile.
1. Administrative Memory as a Condition of Political Order
Administrative memory refers to the capacity of public institutions to retain knowledge, procedures, and practices independently of individual officeholders. It is embedded in archives, professional norms, standardized procedures, and career bureaucracies. Crucially, it allows institutions to learn from past experience and to reproduce decision-making routines without constant reinvention.
Max Weber identified this feature as the defining strength of modern bureaucracy: predictability through rule-bound administration (Economy and Society). In Weberian systems, authority is exercised through offices rather than persons, and decisions are justified by reference to rules rather than loyalty.
Empirical evidence confirms this logic. In the United Kingdom, for example, frequent changes in government have not disrupted the continuity of public administration. Senior civil servants remain in office across political cycles, preserving policy memory even when ministerial priorities shift. The Northcote–Trevelyan reforms of the nineteenth century institutionalized this separation between political leadership and administrative execution, producing long-term stability (Hennessy, Whitehall).
Similarly, in Sweden, administrative agencies enjoy a high degree of autonomy from political interference. Ministers set policy direction but are legally constrained from intervening in individual administrative decisions. This institutional design has allowed Swedish governance to remain stable despite ideological alternation (Rothstein, The Quality of Government).
2. Personalization and the Disruption of Continuity
Where authority is personalized, administrative memory becomes vulnerable. Appointments are made on the basis of loyalty rather than competence, turnover accelerates, and institutional knowledge is treated as a private asset rather than a public resource. Each political transition thus initiates a purge, whether formal or informal, erasing accumulated experience.
This pattern is evident in many post-authoritarian and post-conflict states. In Iraq after 2003, the policy of de-Baathification led to the removal of large segments of the civil service. While politically motivated, the effect was institutional: ministries lost operational capacity, coordination deteriorated, and the state struggled to deliver basic services (Dodge, Iraq: From War to a New Authoritarianism).
A comparable dynamic unfolded in post-revolutionary Egypt. Despite the survival of formal state structures after 2011, repeated purges and politicization of administrative appointments weakened bureaucratic coherence. Decision-making became increasingly centralized and personalized, undermining institutional learning (Brownlee, Authoritarianism in an Age of Democratization).
In such systems, administration ceases to function as a stabilizing buffer. Instead, it becomes an extension of political struggle.
3. Administrative Turnover and Systemic Fragility
High rates of administrative turnover are not merely a symptom of instability; they are a mechanism that reproduces it. When civil servants anticipate dismissal following political change, incentives shift toward short-term extraction rather than long-term performance. Institutional loyalty gives way to factional alignment.
The case of Haiti illustrates this logic with particular clarity. Public administration has long been subject to extreme politicization, with senior and mid-level officials routinely replaced after changes in government. As a result, ministries lack continuity, records are inconsistently maintained, and policy implementation depends heavily on external actors (Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic).
Afghanistan exhibited a similar pattern prior to 2021. Ministries were formally structured, yet constant rotation of personnel and parallel appointment systems undermined institutional memory. International assistance often bypassed state structures, further weakening bureaucratic accumulation (World Bank, Afghanistan Public Expenditure Review).
In both cases, the absence of administrative continuity transformed political transition into institutional reset.
4. Informality as a Substitute for Memory
When formal institutions lose memory, informal networks fill the void. Decision-making shifts from documented procedures to personal relationships, patronage networks, and ad hoc negotiations. While such arrangements can provide short-term functionality, they undermine predictability and accountability.
In Nigeria, for example, despite a relatively stable constitutional order, informal practices continue to shape administrative outcomes. Clientelism compensates for bureaucratic weakness but also perpetuates inefficiency and corruption (Lewis, Growing Apart: Oil, Politics, and Economic Change in Indonesia and Nigeria).
In fragile systems, informality becomes dominant rather than supplementary. Governance persists, but outside institutional channels.
5. Why Reform Fails without Administrative Continuity
The erosion of administrative memory explains why reform initiatives often fail in personalized systems. Laws may change, organizational charts may be redesigned, yet practices remain unstable because the carriers of institutional knowledge are absent.
In post-Soviet Ukraine prior to 2014, repeated administrative reforms failed to improve governance because political turnover consistently disrupted bureaucratic continuity. Only after partial insulation of civil service appointments did institutional capacity begin to recover (Kuzio, Ukraine: Democratization, Corruption, and the New Russian Imperialism).
The lesson is not that reform is futile, but that reform without administrative continuity is structurally limited.
Coercive Authority, Security Fragmentation, and the Limits of Political Transition
Institutional continuity cannot be sustained by administrative memory alone. Even the most professional bureaucracy depends on a second pillar: the stable and legitimate monopoly over coercive authority. Where this monopoly is fragmented, politicized, or privatized, political transition ceases to be a regulated process and becomes a contest over force. In such contexts, alternation of power is structurally constrained, and state dissolution becomes a recurrent risk.
1. Coercion as an Institutional Function
In consolidated political systems, coercive authority is embedded within impersonal institutions governed by law. The military, police, and intelligence services operate under hierarchical command structures, standardized procedures, and civilian oversight. Crucially, their loyalty is owed to the state, not to individual leaders or factions.
The post-war consolidation of Western European states illustrates this principle. In France, despite profound political changes between the Fourth and Fifth Republics, the reorganization of coercive authority under constitutional control prevented security fragmentation. The professionalization of the armed forces and the centralization of command ensured continuity even during regime change (Huntington, The Soldier and the State).
Likewise, Spain’s democratic transition after 1975 succeeded in large part because coercive institutions were gradually subordinated to constitutional authority rather than purged wholesale. This strategy preserved operational capacity while reorienting loyalty toward the democratic state (Agüero, Soldiers, Civilians, and Democracy).
2. Personalization and the Politicization of Force
Where authority is personalized, coercive institutions are rarely autonomous. Security forces are tied to ruling coalitions through patronage, ethnic affiliation, or personal loyalty. Political transitions in such systems do not reassign authority peacefully; they threaten the survival of entire security networks.
Iraq after 2003 provides a clear example. The disbanding of the Iraqi army eliminated not only a coercive apparatus, but the institutional framework that centralized force. The result was rapid militarization of political competition, insurgency, and the proliferation of militias that substituted factional loyalty for state authority (Kalyvas, The Logic of Violence in Civil War).
A comparable dynamic unfolded in Yemen after 2011. Despite formal political agreements, security forces remained divided along personal and tribal lines. The absence of a unified coercive structure rendered political compromise unenforceable, contributing directly to state collapse and civil war (Phillips, Yemen and the Politics of Permanent Crisis).
3. Fragmentation of Coercion and the Reset Effect
When coercive authority is fragmented, political transition produces a reset effect rather than reorganization. Each shift at the top triggers re-alignment within security institutions, often accompanied by violence. This dynamic prevents the accumulation of institutional trust and reinforces the perception that political power is existential.
Libya after 2011 exemplifies this pattern. Armed groups emerged as autonomous political actors, controlling territory and resources independently of any central authority. Efforts to build national institutions repeatedly failed because no single actor possessed the coercive capacity to enforce decisions across the territory (Lacher, Libya’s Fragmentation).
In Afghanistan, the personalization of security forces undermined long-term consolidation. Parallel command structures, reliance on local militias, and factional appointments weakened the monopoly of force. When political authority collapsed in 2021, coercive institutions lacked the autonomy required to survive the transition (Giustozzi, The Army of Afghanistan).
4. International Intervention and the Illusion of Security Substitution
External intervention often seeks to compensate for weak coercive capacity by providing security assistance or direct enforcement. While such measures can temporarily stabilize situations, they rarely substitute for institutionalized coercive authority.
Bosnia and Herzegovina offers an instructive case. International peacekeeping forces prevented renewed conflict after 1995, yet the fragmentation of domestic security institutions persisted. As a result, political authority remained dependent on external enforcement, limiting institutional autonomy (Chandler, Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton).
In Mali, international military operations slowed territorial loss but failed to reverse security fragmentation. The absence of unified coercive institutions meant that political transitions remained unstable, culminating in repeated coups (Thurston, Jihadists of North Africa and the Sahel).
These cases demonstrate a consistent pattern: external force can freeze conflict, but it cannot create coercive continuity.
5. Coercion, Legitimacy, and Temporal Depth
The durability of coercive authority depends not only on capacity, but on legitimacy. Where security institutions are perceived as partisan or predatory, their authority erodes over time. Political transitions then expose latent fractures rather than resolve them.
In Colombia, decades of conflict gradually gave way to institutional consolidation as security forces were reprofessionalized and subjected to legal oversight. While challenges remain, the gradual restoration of legitimacy allowed political transitions to proceed without systemic collapse (Pécaut, Order and Violence in Colombia).
By contrast, in Haiti, the absence of a stable and legitimate security apparatus has repeatedly undermined political order. The disbanding and reconstitution of security forces, combined with politicization, has prevented the emergence of coercive continuity (Dupuy, Haiti in the World Economy).
Rule Enforcement, Legal Authority, and the Illusion of Formal Institutions
Administrative continuity and a stable monopoly over coercion are necessary but insufficient conditions for political order. A third element is decisive: the impersonal and predictable enforcement of rules. Where laws exist without being routinely applied, institutions acquire form without substance. Political systems may appear intact while, in practice, governance is governed by discretion, negotiation, or force.
1. Rule Enforcement as the Core of Institutional Credibility
Rules do not derive authority from their promulgation alone, but from their reliable application over time. Predictable enforcement reduces uncertainty, disciplines power, and enables collective coordination. As Douglass North emphasized, institutions function by structuring incentives; without enforcement, rules cannot shape behavior (Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance).
In consolidated systems, enforcement is insulated from political turnover. Courts apply law regardless of electoral outcomes, regulatory agencies operate through standardized procedures, and administrative decisions are subject to review. This insulation allows political change to occur without undermining the credibility of the legal order.
Germany’s post-war constitutional framework illustrates this logic. The Federal Constitutional Court has repeatedly constrained executive authority across party lines, reinforcing the principle that political power operates within legal bounds. This consistency has anchored institutional trust even during periods of political polarization (Kommer, The Constitutional Jurisprudence of the Federal Republic of Germany).
2. Formal Legality without Effective Normativity
In fragile systems, laws often proliferate without corresponding enforcement. Constitutions are revised, codes adopted, and regulatory bodies created — yet these instruments fail to structure behavior. The result is formal legality without effective normativity.
Ukraine prior to the 2014 reforms exemplified this condition. Despite an extensive legal framework aligned with European standards, enforcement remained selective and politicized. Courts functioned inconsistently, regulatory decisions were negotiated informally, and legal outcomes depended on political alignment (Levitsky and Way, Competitive Authoritarianism).
A similar pattern has characterized many post-colonial states where inherited legal frameworks lacked institutional anchoring. In Nigeria, for instance, formal constitutional order has coexisted with widespread discretionary enforcement, weakening the credibility of state authority despite repeated legal reforms (Suberu, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Nigeria).
In such contexts, political transition does not strengthen legality; it reshuffles discretion.
3. Selective Enforcement and the Personalization of Law
Selective enforcement transforms law from a constraint into a resource. When rules are applied unevenly, political actors use legality instrumentally to reward allies and punish opponents. This personalization undermines institutional continuity by tying legal outcomes to political survival.
Russia in the 2000s offers a well-documented case. While legal institutions formally expanded, enforcement became increasingly selective, subordinated to executive priorities. Courts retained procedural form but lost autonomy, converting law into a tool of political management (Sakwa, The Crisis of Russian Democracy).
In Turkey, the politicization of judicial appointments after 2010 weakened the separation between legal authority and political power. As enforcement became more discretionary, political transitions intensified rather than stabilized institutional conflict (Özbudun, Turkey’s Judiciary and the Drift toward Competitive Authoritarianism).
Where enforcement depends on loyalty, rules cannot survive political rupture.
4. The Consequences of Enforcement Failure
When rule enforcement collapses, institutions lose their coordinating function. Economic activity shifts toward informality, citizens rely on personal networks rather than public authority, and coercion substitutes for legality. Political transitions in such environments become moments of acute vulnerability.
Haiti again illustrates this dynamic. Despite the existence of formal legal structures, enforcement has remained weak and inconsistent. Courts lack capacity, policing is fragmented, and legal decisions are frequently unenforced. As a result, political authority struggles to translate formal mandates into effective governance (Lundahl, The Political Economy of Disaster).
Afghanistan exhibited a similar dissociation prior to 2021. Parallel legal systems operated simultaneously, and enforcement depended heavily on local power brokers. Formal legality existed, but normativity was contested, undermining institutional consolidation (Barfield, Afghanistan: A Cultural and Political History).
In both cases, political transitions exposed the fragility of legal authority rather than renewing it.
5. Rule Enforcement and Temporal Accumulation
Effective enforcement is cumulative. It requires repeated application across time, gradually building expectations and trust. Short-term legal interventions cannot substitute for this process.
Chile’s post-authoritarian transition demonstrates how gradual reinforcement of rule enforcement can stabilize political order. Rather than purging legal institutions, reformers focused on incremental strengthening of judicial independence. Over time, this approach consolidated legality without provoking institutional rupture (Siavelis and Mainwaring, Democracy in Chile).
The contrast with Venezuela is instructive. Despite initial constitutional reforms in 1999, progressive erosion of enforcement autonomy transformed legality into executive discretion. Political transitions subsequently deepened institutional fragility rather than restoring order (Corrales and Penfold, Dragon in the Tropics).
Stability as a Cumulative Outcome: Institutions, Time, and Political Survival
Stability is commonly treated as a political objective to be achieved through leadership, consensus, or reform packages. Comparative evidence suggests a different conclusion: stability is not produced by intention, but by accumulation. It emerges when institutions acquire sufficient temporal depth to carry rules, authority, and enforcement across political rupture.
1. Stability as an Emergent Property
In institutional terms, stability is not a starting condition. It is an emergent property generated by repeated interactions between administration, coercion, and law. Political systems do not become stable because leaders seek stability; they become stable because institutions discipline behavior consistently over time.
The experience of post-war Western Europe illustrates this dynamic. Stability did not follow immediately from democratization or reconstruction. It was produced through decades of bureaucratic consolidation, legal routinization, and depoliticization of coercive authority. In Italy, for instance, despite chronic government turnover during the First Republic, institutional continuity preserved state capacity and prevented dissolution (Putnam, Making Democracy Work).
By contrast, in systems lacking this cumulative architecture, stability remains episodic. Temporary calm may follow negotiations or interventions, but it dissipates once political conditions shift.
2. Time Horizons and Institutional Depth
Institutional continuity is inseparable from time horizons. Where political actors expect institutions to survive beyond their tenure, incentives favor compliance, investment, and restraint. Where institutions are expected to reset with each transition, incentives favor extraction, loyalty, and short-term survival.
This distinction is visible in East Asia. South Korea’s political development demonstrates how institutional depth can emerge even after authoritarian rule. Gradual insulation of the civil service, professionalization of security forces, and judicial strengthening extended time horizons, allowing democratic alternation without systemic collapse (Haggard and Kaufman, The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions).
In contrast, in many fragile states, including parts of the Sahel, short political time horizons dominate. Officials anticipate rapid turnover and uncertainty, undermining incentives for institutional investment (van de Walle, African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis).
3. Why Leadership-Centered Explanations Fail
Leadership-centered explanations persist because they offer clarity and agency. Yet they consistently fail to account for cross-national variation. Capable leaders govern collapsing systems; flawed leaders preside over stable ones. The variable that matters is not individual capacity, but institutional constraint.
The contrast between Botswana and Zimbabwe after independence is instructive. Botswana developed a professional bureaucracy and respected legal continuity, producing one of the most stable political systems in sub-Saharan Africa. Zimbabwe, by contrast, personalized authority and politicized enforcement, leading to progressive institutional erosion despite early administrative capacity (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson, Why Nations Fail).
Leadership mattered in both cases, but only within institutional boundaries.
4. Political Transition without Institutional Architecture
Where institutional continuity is absent, political transition becomes a destructive force. Elections intensify competition, reforms trigger resistance, and leadership change exposes structural weakness. In such systems, alternation becomes indistinguishable from rupture.
Haiti exemplifies this condition. Political change has repeatedly disrupted administration, fragmented security, and undermined enforcement. Each transition resets authority rather than reorganizing it, leaving society vulnerable to violence and informal governance (Fatton, Haiti’s Predatory Republic).
Afghanistan followed a comparable trajectory. Despite formal institutions and repeated elections, authority remained personalized and enforcement uneven. When political support collapsed, institutions lacked the autonomy required to survive (Rubin, Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror).
These cases demonstrate that stability cannot be imported, negotiated, or declared. It must be built.
5. The Institutional Threshold of Survival
The analysis across five sections supports a central conclusion: political systems survive transition only when institutions cross a threshold of autonomy and continuity. Below this threshold, governance remains contingent and reversible; above it, political change becomes manageable.
This threshold is not defined by constitutional form, regime type, or ideology. Democracies and autocracies alike can cross it. What matters is whether institutions are capable of:
• preserving administrative memory across leadership change,
• maintaining a unified and legitimate monopoly of coercion,
• enforcing rules impersonally and predictably,
• and disciplining political incentives over time.
Where these conditions converge, stability emerges not as an achievement of will, but as a structural outcome.
6. Conclusion without Closure
The temptation to search for quick fixes — new constitutions, elections, interventions — reflects a misunderstanding of political order. Stability is not an event to be managed, but a temporal process to be sustained.
Societies that fail to build institutional continuity remain exposed to permanent rupture. Those that succeed do not eliminate conflict; they contain it within structures capable of enduring change.
The ultimate lesson is therefore modest but demanding: politics becomes survivable only when institutions learn to outlive it.
References
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• Putnam, R. Making Democracy Work. Princeton University Press.
• Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S., Robinson, J. Why Nations Fail. Crown.
• Huntington, S. The Soldier and the State. Harvard University Press.
• Menkhaus, K. “State Collapse in Somalia.” Third World Quarterly.
• Fatton, R. Haiti’s Predatory Republic. Lynne Rienner.
• Rubin, B. Afghanistan from the Cold War through the War on Terror. Oxford University Press.
• Levitsky, S., Way, L. Competitive Authoritarianism. Cambridge University Press.
• van de Walle, N. African Economies and the Politics of Permanent Crisis. Cambridge University Press.