Capture, Domination, and the Hijacking of Institutional Authority
Introduction: From Performance Failure to Power Distortion
Where functional and performance-based theories conceptualize institutional decline as a failure of outputs, efficiency, or service delivery, power-centered theories shift the analytical focus to a more political register: who controls institutions, how that control is exercised, and to whose benefit institutional authority is deployed. In this perspective, institutions do not primarily decline because they perform poorly. They decline because they are appropriated, distorted, or emptied of constraint by power holders.
Institutional decay, here, is rarely accidental. It is often the byproduct of deliberate strategies pursued by political elites, dominant coalitions, authoritarian leaders, or informal networks seeking to secure resources, loyalty, and control. Institutions may continue to exist formally, and may even appear operational, yet their core functions are redirected away from public mandates toward the reproduction of power. Performance can deteriorate, but this deterioration is frequently a consequence rather than a cause.
Power-centered theories therefore invert the diagnostic logic of functionalism. Decline is not first detected through inefficiency or output failure, but through patterns of capture, exclusion, personalization, and coercion. The institution remains, but its authority no longer constrains power; instead, it becomes an instrument of domination. This article reconstructs power-centered theories of institutional decline by tracing their intellectual foundations, identifying core assumptions, examining key mechanisms of capture, and evaluating their analytical strengths and limitations.
I. Intellectual Foundations of Power-Centered Institutional Analysis
1. Elite Theory and the Structural Tendency Toward Oligarchy
One of the earliest foundations of power-centered institutional analysis lies in classical elite theory. Thinkers such as Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca argued that all complex societies are governed by minorities. Regardless of formal institutional design, decision-making authority tends to concentrate in the hands of relatively small, organized elites. Institutions, from this perspective, are not neutral coordinators of collective life but arenas through which elite domination is stabilized and reproduced.
Robert Michels’ formulation of the “iron law of oligarchy” radicalized this insight. Studying mass political parties, Michels argued that organizational complexity inevitably generates leadership concentration. Technical expertise, control over information, and organizational resources allow leaders to entrench themselves, marginalizing broader participation. Institutional rules, originally designed to enable collective action, gradually become instruments of elite preservation.
In this tradition, institutional decline is not an anomaly but a structural tendency. Institutions decline when their formal rules cease to constrain elites and instead serve to legitimize their dominance. Decline appears as the erosion of accountability, the insulation of decision-makers, and the transformation of representative structures into oligarchic devices.
2. Marxist and Neo-Marxist Approaches: Institutions as Instruments of Domination
Marxist traditions offer a different but complementary foundation. Rather than emphasizing organizational inevitability, Marxist analysis situates institutions within broader relations of domination, particularly class relations. State institutions, legal systems, and bureaucracies are understood as embedded in and reproducing material power structures. Institutions do not merely fail; they function in ways that stabilize existing hierarchies.
From this perspective, institutional decline does not necessarily involve dysfunction. Institutions may operate efficiently while serving narrow interests and eroding their public or egalitarian role. Decline is therefore normative and political rather than technical. An institution that performs well in extracting resources, disciplining labor, or protecting property relations may still be in decline if it no longer serves collective or redistributive functions.
Neo-Marxist approaches extend this logic to contemporary governance, emphasizing how neoliberal reforms, privatization, and marketization transform public institutions into mechanisms of extraction. Regulatory agencies, welfare systems, and public services may be repurposed to facilitate capital accumulation rather than social protection. Decline, in this view, is not a breakdown but a reorientation of institutional purpose.
3. Political Economy and Regulatory Capture
Modern political economy provides a more granular account of power-centered decline through the concept of institutional capture. Scholars analyzing regulatory agencies, financial systems, and public procurement have shown how institutions are systematically colonized by the actors they are meant to regulate. George Stigler’s theory of regulatory capture demonstrated how industries influence regulators to shape rules in their favor. Later work extended this insight to complex networks of lobbying, revolving doors, and informal influence.
In capture scenarios, institutions retain formal authority but lose substantive autonomy. Decision-making shifts from public mandates to private interests. Performance indicators may remain acceptable, or even improve, while institutional independence erodes. Decline is thus defined not by capacity loss but by loss of purpose and constraint.
Political economy approaches emphasize that capture is rarely total or static. It unfolds through incremental processes: selective enforcement, agenda control, information asymmetry, and normalization of conflicts of interest. Institutions are hollowed out from within, often without overt crisis.
4. Authoritarianism, Personal Rule, and the Subordination of Institutions
Power-centered theories also draw heavily from studies of authoritarianism and personalist regimes. In such systems, institutions decline as they are subordinated to the will of a leader or ruling clique. Formal rules are overridden by discretion, loyalty, and coercion. Institutions persist as structures, but their decision-making autonomy is systematically eroded.
Personalist rule transforms institutions into extensions of the leader’s authority. Courts become instruments of repression or protection; legislatures become rubber stamps; bureaucracies become channels for patronage. Institutional decline here is marked by unpredictability: outcomes depend on proximity to power rather than on rules.
Crucially, institutions are not dismantled. They are maintained precisely because they provide legitimacy, coordination, and administrative reach. Decline manifests as emptied constraint, not absence.
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II. Core Assumptions of Power-Centered Theories
Power-centered frameworks rest on assumptions that contrast sharply with functionalist approaches.
1. Institutions as Arenas of Struggle
Rather than neutral systems of coordination, institutions are understood as arenas of contestation. Competing actors seek to control institutional resources, rules, and decision-making processes. Decline occurs when one group succeeds in monopolizing control, eliminating checks and balances, and insulating itself from accountability.
Institutions are therefore dynamic sites of struggle, not stable technical devices. Their design matters, but their operation is shaped by power relations.
2. Power Precedes Performance
In power-centered theories, performance outcomes are secondary. Institutions may perform well or poorly, but what matters analytically is who benefits. An institution can deliver services efficiently while entrenching domination. Performance metrics can thus mask deeper forms of decline.
This assumption challenges the functionalist premise that performance is the primary indicator of institutional health. From a power-centered perspective, performance can coexist with decay.
3. Informality as a Central Mechanism
Power-centered approaches emphasize the role of informal networks, patronage systems, and coercive practices. Formal institutional rules coexist with informal structures that often determine actual outcomes. Decline is marked by the displacement of formal authority by informal power.
This focus on informality explains why institutional decline can be difficult to detect through official indicators. Institutions appear intact while substantive authority shifts elsewhere.
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III. Mechanisms of Institutional Decline Through Power Capture
Power-centered theories identify recurring mechanisms through which institutions are hijacked and degraded.
1. Elite Capture and Clientelism
Elite capture occurs when institutions are systematically used to distribute resources to a narrow group in exchange for loyalty. Appointments, contracts, licenses, and services are allocated based on allegiance rather than merit or need. Over time, institutional autonomy erodes as decision-making becomes embedded in patronage networks.
Formal rules persist, but their application becomes selective. Decline manifests as predictability for insiders and arbitrariness for outsiders.
2. Personalization of Authority
In personalized systems, institutional decision-making is subordinated to individual discretion. Rules are applied selectively, and bureaucratic procedures become rituals rather than constraints. Institutions lose their capacity to structure expectations and reduce uncertainty.
Personalization produces a distinctive form of decline: institutions function, but outcomes become unpredictable. Authority no longer resides in offices but in persons.
3. Coercion and the Normalization of Fear
Power-centered theories highlight coercion as a driver of institutional erosion. When compliance is enforced through fear rather than legality, institutions cease to function as rule-based systems. Courts, police, and regulatory bodies may exist, but their actions reflect political directives rather than legal mandates.
Coercion replaces legitimacy, but at a cost: institutions lose informational capacity, trust, and adaptive flexibility. Decline is masked by obedience.
4. Hollowing Out of Accountability Mechanisms
Institutions decline when oversight bodies, auditing mechanisms, and independent authorities are neutralized. Accountability is replaced by loyalty; transparency becomes performative. This hollowing-out process is often gradual, making decline difficult to detect through performance indicators alone.
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IV. Empirical Illustrations of Power-Centered Institutional Decline
1. Regulatory Capture in Advanced Economies
In many advanced economies, regulatory agencies maintain high technical capacity while being effectively captured by the industries they regulate. From a functional perspective, institutions may appear competent. From a power-centered perspective, they have declined fundamentally by losing independence.
2. Post-Revolutionary and Post-Transition States
In post-revolutionary contexts, institutions are often rapidly politicized. Revolutionary elites consolidate control by reshaping bureaucracies, purging opponents, and centralizing authority. Decline follows not from incapacity but from the deliberate elimination of pluralism and constraint.
3. Authoritarian Consolidation
In authoritarian regimes, parliaments, courts, and anti-corruption bodies often persist as formal entities. However, their autonomy is systematically eroded. Institutions become instruments of domination rather than governance, marking a profound form of institutional decay despite surface-level stability.
4. Hybrid Regimes and Informal Power
In hybrid regimes, democratic institutions coexist with informal networks of power. Elections, courts, and ministries operate alongside patronage systems that determine real outcomes. Decline is subtle: institutions function selectively, reinforcing inequality and exclusion.
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V. Analytical Strengths of Power-Centered Theories
Power-centered approaches offer decisive advantages.
1. Explanatory Depth
They explain why institutions may fail even when resources and capacity are present. Decline is traced to structural power relations rather than technical shortcomings.
2. Sensitivity to Informality
By foregrounding informal practices, power-centered theories capture realities invisible to performance metrics.
3. Political Realism
These frameworks acknowledge that institutions are embedded in power struggles and cannot be understood in isolation from political conflict.
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VI. Limits and Risks of Power-Centered Explanations
Despite their strengths, power-centered theories face limitations.
1. Over-Politicization
By interpreting all institutional outcomes through power, these theories risk neglecting genuine capacity constraints and technical failures.
2. Measurement Difficulties
Power capture and informal domination are harder to observe and quantify, complicating comparative analysis.
3. Normative Ambiguity
Not all power concentration constitutes decline. Power-centered theories sometimes lack clear criteria for legitimate authority.
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VII. Interim Conclusion: Decline as Institutional Hijacking
Power-centered theories redefine institutional decline as a process of appropriation and distortion rather than dysfunction. Institutions decline when they cease to constrain power and instead become tools of domination—even if they continue to operate efficiently.
This perspective reveals dimensions of institutional erosion invisible to functionalist analysis. Yet it remains incomplete. Institutions may lose authority without full capture or coercion. To explain such cases, analysis must turn to normative–legitimacy frameworks, which examine trust, consent, and the moral foundations of institutional authority.
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References
• Acemoglu, Daron & Robinson, James. Why Nations Fail. Crown, 2012.
• Michels, Robert. Political Parties. Free Press, 1962.
• Mosca, Gaetano. The Ruling Class. McGraw-Hill, 1939.
• Pareto, Vilfredo. The Mind and Society. Harcourt, 1935.
• Stigler, George. “The Theory of Economic Regulation.” Bell Journal of Economics, 1971.
• Skocpol, Theda. States and Social Revolutions. Cambridge University Press, 1979.
• North, Douglass C. Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance. Cambridge University Press, 1990.