Abstract

The unipolar moment that defined the post-Cold War world is drawing to a close. A new multipolar order is emerging, driven by the rise of Asia, the decline of Western hegemony, and the urgent need for global cooperation on existential challenges. This article explores the geopolitical and philosophical implications of this transition, drawing from the ideas of Jeffrey Sachs, Antonio Gramsci, Joseph Nye, Fareed Zakaria, and others. It assesses the five major theories of global order—hegemonic stability, hegemonic competition, hegemonic decline, realist multipolarity, and cooperative multilateralism—and argues that only the latter offers a viable path toward peace and sustainable development. By examining the cases of China’s rise, the war in Ukraine, and the role of multilateral institutions, the article proposes a new architecture of global governance grounded in equity, inclusion, and common goods.

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Keywords

Multipolarity, Global Governance, Jeffrey Sachs, Hegemony, International Relations, Global South, Sustainable Development, Gramsci, Zakaria, Multilateralism

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Introduction

Since the voyages of Columbus and Vasco da Gama over five centuries ago, the trajectory of global power has largely been a Western story: European empires gave way to British dominance, then to American primacy in the 20th century. From 1945 onward, and especially following the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the United States emerged as the unrivaled hegemon of a unipolar world. However, as Jeffrey Sachs eloquently argues, this era is fading—not with a collapse, but with a rebalancing. The rise of China, the resurgence of India, the economic vitality of the Global South, and the resurgence of regional power centers are ushering in a truly multipolar world. But as Antonio Gramsci warned, transitions of this magnitude give birth to a “great variety of morbid symptoms.”

We stand at such a historical crossroads: the old world is dying, the new struggles to be born, and the global system reveals increasing signs of dysfunction—conflict, ecological collapse, institutional paralysis, and geopolitical fragmentation. This article interrogates the dynamics of this transition and argues for a new form of cooperative multipolarity rooted in multilateral governance and shared responsibility.

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Section I — Theoretical Framework: Five Competing Visions of Global Order

The current transformation in global order has been interpreted through various theoretical lenses. Sachs identifies five major frameworks:
1. Hegemonic Stability Theory (HST): This theory posits that global peace and economic openness require a dominant power to enforce rules and norms. It has long underpinned U.S. foreign policy thinking, echoed in the works of scholars like Robert Gilpin and Charles Kindleberger. In this view, American decline spells danger for global stability.
2. Hegemonic Competition Theory: Popularized by Graham Allison through the “Thucydides Trap,” this theory predicts conflict when a rising power (China) threatens a dominant one (U.S.). Historically, such rivalries—Athens vs. Sparta, Britain vs. Germany—led to war. The implication: the U.S.–China dynamic is inherently unstable.
3. Hegemonic Decline Theory: This approach views the U.S. as no longer capable—or willing—to maintain global leadership. Scholars such as Paul Kennedy and Immanuel Wallerstein situate America’s decline in a broader historical cycle of imperial overstretch and systemic fatigue.
4. Realist Multipolarity: Rooted in neorealism (e.g., Kenneth Waltz), this perspective sees the world as a self-help system where multiple great powers pursue their interests, leading to a fluid, often unstable, balance of power.
5. Cooperative Multilateralism (Sachs’ View): This is the article’s preferred lens. It asserts that the complexity of 21st-century challenges—climate change, pandemics, AI governance—demands not competition but cooperation. A multipolar world must be managed through inclusive, rules-based institutions capable of delivering global public goods.

Section II — The End of Western Primacy: From Empire to Equilibrium

The narrative of Western dominance, while often portrayed as a linear rise of reason, democracy, and capitalism, is deeply entangled with conquest, colonization, and systemic inequality. For nearly five centuries, Western empires imposed a Eurocentric global order, beginning with the Age of Discovery and culminating in British supremacy during the 19th century. After World War II, leadership shifted to the United States, which became the linchpin of the liberal international order.

The post-1945 period witnessed the construction of key global institutions—the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, and later the WTO—all structured under Western influence, particularly American. The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 reinforced this dominance, leading Charles Krauthammer to coin the term “unipolar moment.” During this time, the U.S. projected power through military interventions, economic globalization, and cultural soft power. As Joseph Nye noted, America’s appeal was not only in its tanks but in its tech and television.

However, this unipolarity masked growing contradictions. The 2008 global financial crisis revealed the vulnerabilities of Western-led capitalism. The Iraq War exposed the limits of American militarism and eroded trust in U.S. leadership. Meanwhile, countries once seen as peripheries—China, India, Brazil, and others—were rising economically and diplomatically. What Jeffrey Sachs describes is not a sudden collapse of the West, but a “natural rebalancing” of historical weight, where civilizations once suppressed are reclaiming agency in a more pluralistic world.

Gramsci’s notion of “interregnum”—a phase where the old is dying but the new is not yet born—is strikingly relevant here. In this space, morbid symptoms emerge: resurgent nationalism, technological fragmentation, environmental degradation, and geopolitical aggression. These are not just side effects; they are signals of a system in search of a new center of gravity.

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Section III — China, India, and the Rise of the Rest

In his historical analysis, Sachs highlights that the shift to multipolarity is driven not by Western decline alone but by the rise of the rest. Nowhere is this clearer than in the resurgence of Asia, particularly China and India, which until the 18th century accounted for over half of global output. Their current rise, therefore, is not an anomaly but a return to historical patterns.

China’s ascent is unprecedented in modern history. Since the late 1970s, China has lifted over 800 million people out of poverty, becoming the world’s largest economy by purchasing power parity (PPP). It leads in sectors such as 5G, electric vehicles, and AI. Contrary to the Western model of liberal capitalism, China’s state-led development challenges the idea that free markets and democracy are prerequisites for growth. Its success has led scholars like Kishore Mahbubani to argue that the “Asian century” is not a prediction—it is a reality unfolding.

India, meanwhile, has become the world’s most populous country, the third-largest economy by PPP, and the fastest-growing major economy. It has positioned itself as both a counterweight to China and a bridge between the Global South and Western powers. India’s diplomatic agility—joining BRICS, leading the G20, engaging in the Quad—reflects a multi-aligned strategy suited to multipolarity.

Beyond China and India, regional powers like Brazil, Indonesia, South Africa, Saudi Arabia, and Nigeria are asserting their voices. BRICS, once a symbolic bloc, now rivals the G7 in aggregate GDP by PPP. As Fareed Zakaria notes, we are witnessing “the post-American world,” not in the sense of anti-Americanism, but in the emergence of diverse centers of economic, cultural, and geopolitical influence.

However, the rise of these powers is not merely economic—it is normative. They are demanding a say in rule-making, not just rule-following. This is evident in calls to reform the UN Security Council, to adjust voting rights at the IMF and World Bank, and to develop parallel institutions such as the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank. These reflect a desire for a multipolar governance system that respects sovereignty and regional agency.

Yet challenges remain. The China-U.S. rivalry, border tensions between India and China, and internal democratic deficits in many emerging powers risk destabilizing this new equilibrium. Multipolarity, as Sachs reminds us, is not inherently peaceful—it requires coordination, recognition, and shared purpose. Without a cooperative framework, the “rise of the rest” could devolve into a fragmented, competitive chaos.

Section IV — The Case for a New Multilateralism

If the 20th century was defined by power blocs, ideological confrontation, and American-led institutional design, then the 21st demands something radically different: a multilateralism of necessity—rooted not in dominance, but in cooperation, inclusivity, and global responsibility.

Jeffrey Sachs calls this the “multilateralist theory”—a vision in which global governance is not a contest between great powers, but a collective effort to provide global public goods: climate stability, pandemic prevention, nuclear non-proliferation, and equitable development. In a world where challenges are transnational, our solutions must be as well.

The Limits of Traditional Multilateralism

Existing global institutions, though built with noble intentions, are no longer fit for purpose. The United Nations Security Council, with its five permanent members (P5) and veto powers, reflects the geopolitical realities of 1945, not 2025. Key actors—India, Brazil, Nigeria, Indonesia—remain underrepresented, while entire continents like Africa lack a permanent seat at the top table.

Similarly, the Bretton Woods institutions (IMF and World Bank) have historically imposed conditionalities aligned with neoliberal orthodoxy and Western geopolitical interests. These policies have often failed to deliver inclusive growth and have eroded trust in the West’s claims of moral leadership (Stiglitz, 2002).

This crisis of legitimacy is not just procedural—it is existential. Without inclusive representation and shared decision-making, international institutions cannot command the global buy-in necessary to address planetary threats.

Towards a Post-Hegemonic Multilateralism

A genuinely new multilateralism must go beyond reforming voting shares and board compositions. It must reflect four foundational shifts:
1. From hierarchy to polycentric governance
Institutions should reflect the diffusion of power—not just among states, but also to cities, civil societies, indigenous communities, and transnational networks. Multilateralism must become multilevel and multi-actor.
2. From zero-sum geopolitics to shared goals
As Sachs emphasizes, challenges like climate change and pandemics are not winnable by one nation—they are either solved collectively or not at all. The global commons must become a central organizing logic.
3. From donor-recipient aid to co-investment partnerships
The language of development must shift from dependency to sovereignty and co-creation. This includes recognizing the Global South as a source of innovation and political imagination, not just as a problem to fix.
4. From dominance to dignity
Multilateralism must be rooted in the principle of mutual respect, as outlined in the UN Charter, and operationalized through fairness, accountability, and historical reckoning—particularly with regard to colonial legacies and reparative justice.

As scholars like Amitav Acharya argue, we are entering a “multiplex world” — not a unipolar or bipolar system, but a network of intersecting, overlapping institutions and norms. This complexity should be embraced, not feared.

Emerging Frameworks of Hope

New initiatives already point in the direction Sachs envisions:
• The UN Summit of the Future (2024) aims to realign global institutions with 21st-century challenges.
• The Paris Agreement on climate change, though fragile, represents a consensus-based model grounded in national sovereignty and global responsibility.
• The rise of South-South cooperation, from African-led peace initiatives to Latin American development banks, signals an endogenous model of solidarity.

Yet these efforts remain fragmented and often underfunded. What is needed is political courage, particularly from established powers, to cede space, share leadership, and embrace institutional pluralism.

As Gramsci warned, in the interregnum, “a great variety of morbid symptoms appear.” The task now is to replace those symptoms with structures of healing—institutions capable of binding a fractured world into a more just, secure, and sustainable global society.

Section V — Reforming Global Institutions: Between Realism and Revolution

The legitimacy and effectiveness of global institutions have been increasingly called into question. Designed in the aftermath of World War II, the United Nations, IMF, World Bank, and WTO reflect a world order dominated by the transatlantic alliance and a Western vision of development and security. Today, in a multipolar context, these institutions appear structurally outdated, politically imbalanced, and functionally inadequate.

The UN Security Council: A Mirror of the Past

The most emblematic failure of institutional reform is the UN Security Council (UNSC). Its permanent membership—the United States, the United Kingdom, France, Russia, and China—excludes India, Brazil, Nigeria, and the African continent as a whole, despite their demographic, economic, and geopolitical weight.

India, the world’s most populous country, the third-largest economy (PPP), and a pivotal actor in both North-South and East-West dialogues, still has no permanent seat. Africa, home to 54 countries and 1.4 billion people, has zero permanent representation. This erodes the UNSC’s moral authority and undermines its ability to mediate conflicts or enforce peace in a credible, inclusive way.

Calls for reform—such as the G4 initiative (India, Germany, Japan, Brazil) and the African Union’s Ezulwini Consensus—have been stalled for decades. As Sachs notes, power is rarely surrendered voluntarily. Yet the price of maintaining this status quo is rising irrelevance.

Bretton Woods Institutions: Engines of Conditionality

The IMF and World Bank, originally intended to stabilize global finance and promote development, have been criticized for enforcing neoliberal austerity, limiting fiscal sovereignty, and reinforcing Western hegemony. The conditional lending of the 1980s and 1990s devastated public services in many Global South countries, leading to what Joseph Stiglitz called “institutional colonialism.”

Even recent climate finance packages, such as those under the Just Energy Transition Partnerships (JETPs), often come with complex layers of conditionality, high interest rates, and unclear governance. Without deep reform, these institutions will remain financial arms of geopolitical influence, not instruments of global equity.

Technology Governance: The New Frontier

Beyond traditional institutions, emerging technologies such as artificial intelligence, biotechnology, and digital infrastructure require global governance frameworks. Yet current discussions are fragmented, with the U.S., EU, and China pursuing divergent regulatory approaches. This could lead to a “tech cold war,” reinforcing digital borders and exacerbating global inequality.

Sachs argues for new, inclusive governance regimes that can manage shared risks—whether pandemics, cyber-attacks, or AI misuse—while democratizing access to innovation. This requires investing in global science, education, and open-source platforms for development.

Pathways Forward: Reform Without Collapse

A radical redesign of global institutions may be politically unrealistic in the short term. However, incremental but cumulative reforms can build legitimacy, improve functionality, and reflect changing power dynamics. These may include:
• Expanding the UNSC to include permanent seats for India, an African Union representative, and a Latin American country;
• Rebalancing voting shares in the IMF and World Bank to reflect 21st-century economic realities;
• Creating a Global Public Goods Fund, independent from national agendas, focused on climate, health, and technology equity;
• Establishing a Global Digital Compact, under the UN, to harmonize rules on data sovereignty, digital rights, and AI governance;
• Empowering regional organizations, such as the African Union, ASEAN, and CELAC, to design localized frameworks aligned with global norms.

Institutional reform is not only a technical necessity—it is a moral imperative. In a multipolar world, legitimacy derives from representation, reciprocity, and respect. Without these, the rules-based order becomes not just fragile, but fundamentally unfair.

Conclusion: The Future Is Multipolar — But Will It Be Peaceful?

The age of singular hegemony is over. The world we inhabit today is no longer centered on Washington, Brussels, or Beijing alone. It is a world shaped by the rise of Asia, the awakening of the Global South, the assertion of regional powers, and the interdependence of all nations in confronting shared, planetary challenges.

Multipolarity is not merely a shift in GDP rankings or military budgets—it represents a transformation in the architecture of global power, identity, and legitimacy. As Jeffrey Sachs has emphasized, this transition could lead us either toward escalating conflict and institutional breakdown, or toward a new age of cooperative problem-solving and global solidarity.

Yet multipolarity in itself guarantees nothing. Without shared values, renewed institutions, and mutual recognition, the world risks becoming more fragmented, nationalistic, and unstable. The persistence of zero-sum mentalities, the weaponization of interdependence, and the resistance of entrenched powers to reform global governance are dangerous forces that can reverse progress.

To prevent this, the world must embrace a new multilateralism—one that moves beyond the rigid Westphalian state system and toward networked sovereignty, distributed leadership, and inclusive institutions. The foundations of this order are already visible: the reform of the UN system, regional integration, new financial frameworks, and the global mobilization around climate and health.

But vision without political will is insufficient. Leadership in the 21st century will be defined not by dominance, but by the capacity to convene, to listen, and to co-create. This is the essence of Sachs’ multilateralist theory, and it is the only viable answer to the crises of our time.

In Gramsci’s words, we are still living in the interregnum. The old is not yet fully gone; the new is still struggling to be born. But this birth will not happen by default—it will happen by design. And that design must be informed by justice, sustainability, and global cooperation. Only then can multipolarity become not a threat, but a promise.

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